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Non-Technical Summary
Since 2008 Europe is facing a low and heterogeneous economic growth with peripheral countries still struggling to recover from pre-crisis periods. The prolonged low growth environment has been complemented by a contextual period of low inflation and ultra-low yields fostered by the expansionary monetary policy interventions adopted in particular by the ECB and the FED. As a matter of fact the conventional and unconventional interventions of the central banks aimed at contrasting the economic stagnation increased both in frequency and magnitude. The ECB is enforcing since 2013 a series of conventional and unconventional expansionary monetary intervention, including Quantitative Easing. These expansionary interventions, in addition to the welcomed stimulus on the economy, result in extremely low interest rates exacerbating the problems arising from the low yield environment. The persistent low yield environment is heavily affecting the EU financial services industry and it is becoming a severe threat for the life insurers in terms of solvency and sustainability of their business models. From a policymakers perspective an increasing attention on the stability and profitability of life insurers is expressed by EIOPA and some National Competent Authorities that constantly rank the low yield environment as the major source of risk for the life insurers. Concerns are specifically addressed towards companies with a relevant outstanding portfolio of products entailing guaranteed rates of return and profit participation features. The lack of sufficiently remunerable rated assets on the market substantially reduce the capability for (re)insurers to match by a return and duration perspective the outstanding portfolio of guaranteed policies underwritten in high-yield years. ECB QE tend to exacerbate the scarcity of valuable assets on the market. The academia deeply investigates both the effects of the low yields on (re)insurers and the effects of the monetary policy interventions on the markets. On the first topic the studies support the concerns on the vulnerability of the insurance industry to low interest rates with several studies. For what the impacts of central bank interventions are concerned a vast literature scrutinizes the role of the monetary policy announcements on asset pricing with room to be filled in the area of unconventional interventions in near-zero interest rate environments. All in all, if on the one hand there is a common understanding on the relation between monetary interventions, interest rate term structure, on the other hand the effect of unconventional expansionary monetary policy on the market in general and on insurers in particular does not provide conclusive elements, especially in a low or negative yields environment. With this paper we aim at filling this gap by investigating the effect of the conventional and unconventional monetary policy intervention on the insurance industry with a twofold approach. At first we run an event study on the announcement date of the last ECB Quantitative Easing program. We scrutinize the cumulative abnormal return of a sample of 166 (re)insurers split into different subsamples according to size and geographical criteria comparing it with the behavior of the other market participants Subsequently, with the aim of understanding the impact of the general enforced monetary policy strategy and not of a single event, we enlarge the scope of our analysis by investigating the effects on the markets in general and on insurers in particular, of a series of announcements made by the ECB and the Fed. To do so we replicate the approach proposed by Rogers et al. (2014) and Pericoli and Veronese (2016) analyzing how and to what extent the Central Banks announcements are signaled by the stock markets via changes in the term structure of the risk free rate. We apply the model on the same sample of (re)insures over a timeframe of 8 years split into 4 periods according to the economic cycles: i) tranquil period The event study suggests a moderate negative effect of the QE on the insurance industry. The different specifications we tested show how the outcomes of the event study are strongly dependent to the observation periods. Furthermore, we do not obtain statistically significant results for the subsample of the low yield environment. By applying the monetary policy surprise based model, we document how the effect of monetary policy interventions on interest rate in the announcement days changes over time and the subsequent impact of the expansionary monetary policy interventions on the market in general and on the insurance industry in particular. For the two periods from 2008 till 2013 we find that when the monetary policy announcement generates an immediate reduction in the interest rates, the stock market returns increases and the effect on the insurance industry is even stronger and positive. However, in the fourth period, when ECB started the QE program, the impact of monetary policy announcements on stock returns is not statistically significant. The two applied models return consistent results. The results are also the same if we compare the impact on the (re)insurance companies and other non-insurance listed companies Nevertheless this work shows how a single intervention extrapolated from the comprehensive strategy should be utilized with caution to estimate the effect of the monetary policy intervention on the market. For a robustness check we also perform the same analysis using insurance CDS data for the subsample of insurance companies of which the CDS price is available. The analysis shows that the pattern is confirmed and therefore our results are robust even for a smaller sample and using data from the CDS market. We also investigate whether the characteristics of the (re)insurers matters for the impact of the unconventional monetary policy on insurance companies. We investigate to what extent the fundamentals of an insurer, namely the composition of the assets and liability side, are significant determinants for the reaction to monetary policy. Our analysis shows that the sensitivity is mainly driven by size and asset allocation and in particular by exposure to fixed income assets. None of the liability explanatory variables that we consider shows any significance. These results confirms that the peculiarities of the insurance companies are not extremely relevant to explain the impact of monetary policy on both the equity and the CDS price of (re)-insurance companies.
Introduction and literature review
To contrast the economic stagnation affecting Europe, the ECB has, since 2013, enforced a series of conventional and unconventional expansionary monetary interventions, including Quantitative Easing (the last Quantitative Easing (QE) was announced in January 2015). 1
These expansionary interventions, in addition to their welcome stimulus of the economy, result in extremely low interest rates, exacerbating the problems arising from the low-yield environment.
This persistent low-yield environment heavily affects the EU financial services industry, and is becoming a severe threat for life insurers in terms of the solvency and sustainability of their business models. From a policymakers perspective, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) has focused increasing attention on the stability and profitability of life insurers. These constantly rank the low-yield environment as the major source of risk for life insurers (EIOPA (2013) , EIOPA (2014) , EIOPA (2015) ). Concerns are specifically addressed towards companies with a relevant outstanding portfolio of products entailing guaranteed rates of return and profit participation features. The lack of sufficiently remunerable rated assets on the market substantially reduce the capability for (re)insurers to match from a return and duration perspective, the outstanding portfolio of guaranteed policies underwritten in high-yield years. Concerns are shared by the national authorities overseeing markets that are traditionally active in saving products with minimum guaranteed returns, such as Germany. For instance, Deutsche Bundesbank (2013) , from the 2013 stress test exercise, inferred that a persistent lowyield environment would heavily affect the solvency situation of German insurers. Moreover, the report concluded that under particularly adverse conditions, more than 30 per cent of the German life insurers would not meet Solvency II capital requirements by 2023. Comparable results are obtained by Berdin and Grndl (2015) in their model-based analysis on a stylized German life insurers solvency under the Solvency II regime. Wedow and Kablau (2011) analyzed the German market once more and reached less pessimistic conclusions. As a matter of fact, they empirically concluded that given the outstanding stock of guaranteed products, the solvency situation will be threatened only in extremely adverse scenarios. Nevertheless, the authors argue that a prolonged low-yield scenario would progressively worsen the solvency capability of insurance companies offering minimum guaranteed products. In the literature these kinds of products are commonly considered to be the most exposed to the drop in the interest rates. In particular, duration mismatches between assets and liabilities are considered to be the vulnerable point of these products, as qualitatively shown by Holsboer (2000) and theoretically expressed by Li and Wei (2013) . In addition to the minimum guaranteed benefits, the profit participation component seems to cause trouble to insurers, as pointed out by Grosen and Lchte Jrgensen (2000) in their theoretical work. Profit distribution policies have been empirically investigated by Kling and Ru (2007a) , both from a general and local perspective (Kling and Ru, 2007b ). An additional element of vulnerability of the life insurers exposed to a persistent low-yield environment comes from surrender options potentially embedded in the contracts. Gatzert (2008) and Albizzati and Geman (1994) explain how, in periods of low profit sharing returns, policyholders 1 See: ECB (2015).
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can opt for more attractive investments, enhancing the lapse risk. All these studies investigate the issue from a theoretical point of view using numerical simulation; with this work we aim to shed light on the empirical evidence related to stock market evaluation of the impact of unconventional monetary policies on the insurance industry. In fact, if on the one hand there is a common understanding regarding the relationship between monetary interventions and the interest rate term structure, on the other hand the effect on conventional and unconventional expansionary monetary policy on the market does not provide conclusive elements, especially in a low-or negative-yield environment. The impacts of the monetary policy on market valuations have been vastly investigated. Specifically, the role of monetary policy announcements on asset pricing is well documented (see Cook and Hahn (1998) , Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Ehrmann et al. (2011) and Ippolito et al. (2015) , among others). However, the literature on Quantitative Easing and near-zero rates is still in its initial phase and has thus far mainly concentrated on measuring the effects of unconventional monetary policies on aggregates such as inflation and GDP (see Chen et al. (2012) , Chung et al. (2010) , Gambacorta and Peersman (2014) Gambacorta, Hofmann and Peersman (2014) , and Kapetanios et al. (2012) amid others). A number of papers investigates the effect of unconventional policies on financial markets, with a focus on interest rates and equities in the U.S. and developed European countries. Instances of works in this area are Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), D'Amico et al. (2012) , King et al. (1991) , Banerjee et al. (2014) , Li and Wei (2013) and Pericoli and Veronese (2016) . It is worth mentioning various studies that implement the event-study methodology in order to properly investigate the effects of unconventional monetary policies. Regarding the Eurozone, Briciu and Lisi (2015) have identified announcements that can be considered as complete surprises: they then simply added up the jumps in asset prices in short-time windows bracketing these announcements. Nevertheless, complete surprises do not account for market expectations. A way to bypass this issue is offered by Joyce et al. (2011) , by normalizing data looking at the surveys periodically conducted by financial institutions, such as bank and insurances, with the purpose of measuring in a more realistic manner the market surprise in reaction to monetary policy announcements. However, due to the limited availability of surveys, this measure does not represent a viable alternative for many fields. A more effective approach, proposed by Rogers et al. (2014) , has emerged as helpful; this involves measuring the effects of monetary measures on different asset prices relative to changes in government bond yields, and relies on a particular definition of monetary policy surprise, centered on the intraday changes in government bond yields right after the announcement. Despite these ample sources, no analysis has specifically focused on the insurance industry. We therefore focus our attention on how, and to what extent, the 2015 ECB QE and the convention and unconventional expansionary monetary policy strategy deployed by Central Banks impact the market performances of the (re)insurers, in terms of stock returns and Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads. Our approach is twofold. The first part of the analysis identifies the effect of monetary policy interventions on (re)insurers, scrutinizing the reaction of stock prices to the policy actions of Central Banks.
Initially, we elaborate on a simple event study based on a market model (Mackinlay, 1997) around the last ECB QE announcement (22 January 2015). Subsequently, we extend the anal-ysis to a broader sample of announcements, following the approach of Pericoli and Veronese (2016) who compare monetary policy announcement and non-announcement days in different sub-periods. In this second part, our paper builds on the latter intuition. The idea underlying this approach is that the periods are characterized by different "structural parameters", in the spirit of Rigobon (2003) . Within these periods, estimates of impacts are obtained by separately pooling announcement and non-announcement days.
An additional step in the analysis of the impacts of monetary policy announcements consists of the identification of characteristics that drive the sensitivity of the companies to the events thereof. In the literature, the linkage between the impact of the change in interest rates on monetary policy decisions and the exposure of banks to different asset classes and to different businesses has been explored, both in the US and Europe. Arseneau (2017) shows that, in the US banking industry, the impact of monetary policy transmitted by a change in interest rates differs significantly, and much of this heterogeneity can be explained by cross-bank differences in the provision of liquidity services. In Europe, Ampudia and Van-den Heuvel (2017) empirically found that the composition of balance sheets is important in order to understand the effects of monetary policy decisions on banks. In particular, the two authors infer that banks with high deposit ratios are in general less sensitive to changes in interest rates, except when rates are low. To our knowledge, the analysis thereof is limited to the banking industry; therefore, in the second part of this work, we identify the determinants of sensitivity of (re)insurers to the ECB's monetary policy announcements based on the asset and liability composition of their balance sheet. We base our analysis on a logit regression, using the sensitivity of the (re)insurers to monetary policy interventions as a dependent variable, and a set of balance sheet-based indices approximating asset allocation and liability exposures as regressors.
The paper is structured in five sections. The introduction provides a review of the main relevant studies and presents the overall content of the study. In Section 2 and 3, we present the applied methodology and describe the utilized market-based and balance sheet-based datasets, respectively. Section 4 summarizes the empirical evidence of the effect of monetary policies on the insurance industry, and the determinants of the sensitivity of (re)insurers to the events thereof. The article concludes with the presentation of the main findings and further implications (Section 5).
Methodology
Our analysis encompasses two steps: i we investigate the effects of conventional and non-conventional monetary policy interventions on the stock prices of a set of listed companies selected from different industries and different geographical areas (monetary policy impact analysis);
ii we then empirically identify the main determinants, at the balance sheet level, of the sensitivity of European (re)insures to the monetary policy actions of the ECB (analysis of the determinants) 4
Monetary Policy Impact Analysis
To evaluate the effect of non-conventional monetary policy interventions enforced by the ECB, we focused on the QE program launched on the 22 nd of January 2015. More specifically, we designed an event study based on a market model around the announcement of the QE program.
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns of insurers are computed against different samples in order to insulate the effect of the QE on the broad insurance market and on a set of subsamples defined according to geographical areas and sizes and in terms of total assets. We split the full sample based on geographical perspective into: i) US (re)insurers, ii) EU (re)insurers, iii) EMU (re)insurers, and iv) EU non EMU (re)insurers. Size-wise, we dissected the sample into big and small (re)insurers. It is worth noting that in this article we utilize the notation "big and small" in a relative manner. The sample includes large listed (re)insurers; nevertheless, to understand whether and to what extent size acts as determinant of the impacts of monetary policy intervention on insurers, we use the following divide: a threshold of EUR 50bn, used by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) as a size criterion to identify G-SII insurers (IAIS (2016)). We computed, for each group, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) around the announcement date, using a twoday event window as in Chen et al. (2012) as follows: 2
where i represents the institution and j represents the time. The Abnormal Return (AR) of an institution i is computed according to equation (1).
where the OR expresses the observed market return of the institution i, whereas IR expresses the implied return of the same institution. We compute implied returns on the (re)insurer i in an estimation window from 26 August, 2013 to 20 January, 2015 .
whereβ i is derived via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) according to equation (4):
In the second part of the monetary policy impact analysis, in order to identify the causal relationship of monetary policy, we estimated an ordinary least squares regression of daily returns of(re)insurance companies on monetary policy surprises. Based on the fact that in the first instance, conventional and unconventional monetary policies affect the risk-free rate term structure, we define, according to Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Rogers et al. (2014) , the monetary policy surprise as the linear combination of changes on the overall term structure of interest rates. We then estimate the impact of the monetary policy surprise on the market returns of a panel of listed companies via OLS regressions, according to equation (5). Pericoli and Veronese (2016), we used a set of control variables represented by X t,j , namely the US Citi Economic Surprise Index (CESI), the Euro-area CESI, and the VIX. Equation (5) is estimated only around, but close to, ECB(t = t aECB ) or F ed(t = t a F ED) announcement days, split into five periods as follows. The five periods and the yield movements are reported in figure 1 which depicts the term structure of the Euro Area risk free rates for the maturities used to compute the PCA and the decomposition of the 5 periods (vertical lines).
Figure 1: ECB risk-free rate term structure 1, 2, 5, 7, 10-year maturity.
Yield curve spot rate -1, 2, 5, 7, 10-year maturity -Government bond, nominal, all issuers whose rating is triple A -Euro area (changing composition). Vertical lines identify the periods. Source: ECB.
In order to check potential behavioral implications driven by the attempt of the market to anticipate or delay potential reactions to monetary policy announcements by the Central Banks, we tested the regression displayed in equation 5, not only on the day of announcement but also on a 3-day moving window around the day of announcement.
This specification allows the investigation of whether conventional and unconventional monetary policies have been effective over time in fostering favorable conditions for (re)insurers when policy rates were stuck at the zero lower boundary, and if their transmission, operated through a decrease in term premiums, benefit the insurance industry. 4 We also investigated the impact of monetary policy intervention on different markets. To that end, we applied the monetary policy surprise framework defined to assess the impacts on equity returns, namely the OLS model displayed in 5, and the split of the time frame in equation 5 periods as depicted in Figure 1 to the CDS market. Against this background, the CDS-based specification of equation 5 is:
where ∆CDS t is the first difference of the CDS spreads observed in the market at time t. The set of regressors and their definitions are unchanged with respect to equation 5. The specification was tested in 3-day windows centered around the day of announcement.
Analysis of the determinants
In the analysis of determinants, we scrutinized whether the asset and liability structure might explain the higher or lower sensitivity of a (re)insurance undertaking to monetary policy interventions. Changes in yields in general, and in the reference risk-free rate in particular have impacts on both sides of the balance sheet of a (re)insurer. In fact, independent of the regulatory regime, the economic valuation of assets and the best estimates backing the provisioning reflect In order to test the relationship between defined balance-based indicators and sensitivity to monetary policy intervention, we ran a panel regression on the set of European (re)insurers on the five periods of observations. Specifically, we ran a Logit regression for each European company using as dependent a dummy variable defined on the coefficient of the regressor ∆RF R ECB t=t aECB obtained via equation 5, as follows:
We use as the regressor set, the set of defined balance sheet items.
The baseline for the i th (re)insurer follows:
where X j includes the set of balance sheet indices reported in Table 1 .
The contributions we expect from the indices thereof are strictly related to the characteristics of the different activities undertaken by the (re)insurers. It is worth noting that here we are using the word activity in a broad sense, namely including both the type of underwritten contract (e.g., life, non-life, non-traditional insurance activities) and the investment strategy enforced to back liabilities.
More specifically, we expect that the sensitivity of a (re)insurer to monetary policy intervention would be primarily driven by its asset allocation, particularly from its exposure to fixed income assets and equity assets. In particular, we expect that high exposure to fixed income assets, the value of which is directly influenced by the level of the risk-free rate, would be associated with high sensitivity (Hp.1 ).
Given that insurance is a liability-driven business where assets are primarily used to back the obligations of (re)insurers towards their policyholders, we also expect that the composition of the portfolio of liabilities plays a role in sensitivity to the monetary policy actions. A company more exposed to the life business, traditionally characterized by long-term liabilities, shall be more prone to shocks to yields, than a company active in the non-life business, which is usually based on yearly contracts, the price of which is adjustable at the same frequency (Hp.2 ). We also expect that engagement in non-traditional insurance activities, which usually implies maturity transformation-based products, might play a role (Hp.3 ).
Being well aware that the interactions between assets and liabilities is of utmost importance to determine the exposure of a (re)insurer to fluctuations in market yields, we were keen to test the contribution of the duration mismatch between the assets and liabilities of (re)insurers.
However, i) the scarce availability of data at sufficient level of granularity, and ii) the huge debate on how to calculate the duration of the (re)insurers portfolios encompassing optionalities embedded in both sides the assets (e.g., derivatives used for hedging purpose) and liabilities (e.g., profit participation-related benefits) prevent us from using these metrics in this paper.
In order to cope with mismatching between balance sheet reporting, which is available on a yearly basis, and the extension of the period that we defined for the monetary policy surprise analysis, we matched each of the five periods with the average figures disclosed by (re)insurers in balance sheets reported during the corresponding time frame, as reported in Table 2 . mation panel a set of indices for each geographical area containing all relevant listed companies, namely excluding all the small caps and the (re)insurers encompassed in our panel (i.e. only the largest companies that jointly account for 80% of the total market capitalization were used to compute country level market indices). Additionally, we remove all insurance companies and all companies that had less than 120 active trading days in any year. Based on end-year market capitalization figures, we computed weighted country market returns. We then built a set of country-based indices based on the market capitalization of the companies in order to scrutinize the effect of the QE i) at the European and US level, and ii) at the country level. Additionally, we split the sample according to the size of the insurers in order to understand whether and to what extent size acts as a determinant of the impact of monetary policy intervention on insurers. Table 3 provides details of the sample of (re)insurers. For the second part of our analysis, we regressed the stock returns of the (re)insurers based on the change in the risk-free rate term structure during the monetary policy days defined according to scheduled and unscheduled central bank board meetings, as well as on those days when relevant news on monetary policies were disclosed (Table 4 displays the summary statistics of the returns). 6
The comparison of the stock returns during monetary policy days and other days provides heterogeneous outcomes. In the first two periods, the average values of the stock returns on the monetary policy days of the ECB and FED were lower than the values observed on "other days". The situation changed in the third period where higher returns are associated with monetary policy days. Values revert again in periods 4 and 5. Furthermore, we replicated the analysis of the first difference of the CDS spreads of 43 (re)insurers (descriptive statistics displayed in Table 5 . In the first three periods of observation, the average change in CDS spreads was positive during the announcement days, and larger on non-announcement days. This pattern was not observed in periods 4 and 5. The CDS market shows a consistent pattern with respect to the stock market, specifically, a decrease in stock performance is associated with an increase in CDS spreads. It worth noting that the sample of (re)insurers with a sufficiently extended time series of traded CDS is materially smaller (43 entities: 5 EU, 26 US e 2 NON-EU) compared to the sample used for the stock return analysis (166 entities). ), also include the VIX, the CESI EUR and the CESI USD indices as control variables. Table 6 displays summary statistics of the independent variables for the five periods of observation. ECB announcement days had different impacts on the interest rates during different periods of observation. Periods 1, 2, and 4 displayed an average decrease in the rates on announcement days, with average interest rate changes of -0.134%, -0.517% and -0.137%, respectively, and with significant variations from the changes on "Other days", which were reported to be +0.194%
in period 1, +0.463% in period 2, and +0.231% in period 4. Periods 3 and 5 exhibited the opposite reaction in rates, with, on average, a positive change in interest rates (+0.055% and +1.161%), and with variations from the changes on "Other days" of +0.835% in period 3 and -0.005% in period 5. The change in interest rates in response to monetary policy actions can be explained by the fact that the intervention either was in the direction of a decrease in interest rates or, despite being for a reduction of interest rates, did not match the expectation of the market that reacted in the opposite direction.
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Analysis of the determinants
For the analysis of determinants, we retrieved from SNL Financials the year-end balance sheet data of the panel of 70 European (re)insurers used in the monetary policy impact analysis. Table 7 . 
Empirical evidences
In this section we report the application of the approach explained in Section 2. We start 
Monetary Policy Impact Analysis
Event study
We designed the event study based on an event window of -2/+2 days (see shaded cells
in Table 8 ). We select a 4-day event window in order to capture the expectation effect that would be reflected in prices in the few days before the announcement on the one hand, and the adjustments subsequent the announcement on the other hand. A longer event window would be prone to capture spurious effects originating from other events that may happen in the market.
According to this specification, the QE has a significant negative impact on the return of the full sample of (re)insurers (column Total). The same can be observed regarding the different geographical and size-based subsamples. In this respect, however, the level of significance is insufficient. The only exception is represented by the US subsample (column US). This subsample reports impacts that are small but of higher significance compared to those in the full sample. This result cannot be explained based on the information available. It also cannot be connected to the ECB intervention. Therefore, it may be related to other concurrent events and hence deserves further analysis. The evolution of CARs over time for country-based subsamples is provided in Appendix A.1. As a robustness check, we tested other event windows without obtaining statistically significant results. Furthermore, the direction and significance of the impacts of the QE announcement are strongly dependent on the parameters of the event study, namely the size of the event window and the estimation window (see Table 8 above in the non-shaded cells). In fact, when restricting the event window to the day of the announcement (-0/+0), the empirical evidence offers the same picture, albeit with the opposing sign and lower magnitude. The smaller coefficients, despite their significance, reveal how the market reflected the expected monetary action in the preceding days, leaving some adjustments for the day of the announcement. From the event study, we were unable to reach a clear-cut conclusion regarding the impact of the last ECB QE announcement on (re)insurers. The limited and somewhat contradictory evidence suggests that the 2015 QE was not well received by the insurance market. However, the limited magnitude and volatility of the direction of the impact suggest the need for a wider approach that evaluates general monetary policy strategy encompassing several interventions enforced by the Central Banks.
Monetary policy surprise
Monetary policy interventions cannot be considered standalone actions; they are at simultaneously both the cause and the consequence of complex and interrelated macroeconomic circumstances. The analysis of a standalone event (e.g. a QE announcement) excerpted from the larger set of monetary policy actions encompassed in the overall monetary policy strategy may lead to partial and potentially misleading results. In order to overcome this, we propose an identification approach that takes direct inspiration from Rogers et al. (2014) and Pericoli and Veronese (2016) . According to the authors, monetary policy interventions are transmitted to the market through variation in yields over the whole interest rate term structure. The effects of Central Bank announcements are signaled by statistically significant higher monetary policy surprise during event days compared to non-event days. This can be observed in each of the five periods (Table 9 Monetary Policy Surprise -Volatility of the first component of the interest rate term structure). Furthermore, market returns of (re)insurers and other listed institutions reflect announcement events, but with a statistically significant increase in volatility limited to the first three periods. Table 9 : Monetary Policy Surprise -Volatility of the first component of the interest rate term structure. The table reports the volatility of i) the first PCA factor using the 1-year, 3-year, 5-year, 7-year and 10-year bond yield dissected for the Euro area and the US and for the different periods of observation; ii) the market returns of the (re)insurers included in the sample, and iii) the market returns of the indices of financial services deducted by (re)insurers. Additionally, the P-value for the one sided F-test of difference in variances is reported, namely H 0 : σ event > σ no−event .
Monetary This is also in line with the comparison of stock returns observed during monetary policy days and "other days". As displayed in Table 4 during the first two periods, when monetary policy impacts are deemed to have negative impacts on the market, the stock returns observed during monetary policy days are lower than those observed on "other days", and period 3 shows the opposite behavior.
Furthermore, it worth noting that even if a statistically significant impact can also be observed in the first period of observation, the values of the coefficient associated with the monetary policy surprise are smaller than during crisis periods, signaling a lower effectiveness of Central Bank interventions during "tranquil" periods. These results were confirmed when we analyzed geographical subsamples based on macroareas, but with some distinctions (ref. Figure 3) . In addition to the confirmation of the significance observed in the first three periods, the results show how, during crisis periods, the impact of ECB monetary policies on EMU institutions is higher than that on other geographical sub- In concordance with doubts about Greece's Euro-reversibility from the European Sovereign debt crisis onward, and the exclusion of Greece from the ECB QE programme, this jurisdiction appears to be only marginally affected by the monetary policy actions enforced by the ECB.
Coefficients are indeed not statistically significant throughout the periods of observation.
The comparison between industries shows how, in highly affected jurisdictions, the impact of monetary policy actions is larger in the insurance industry, whereas in other countries such as Austria, Denmark, and Norway, the reaction is larger in the non-insurance industry. Again, the asset and liability composition of the (re)insurers based in these jurisdictions could provide an explanation of this result. The figures displayed so far stem from equation 5, calculated with a 3-day window (2 days prior and the announcement day). In order to test potential behaviors of the companies, we ran the regression after moving the 3-day window around the announcement day. The different windows show a moderate trend among (re)insurers to anticipate announcements rather than reacting to them with some delay. Indeed, as shown in the appendix A.5 the coefficients and level of significance decrease when moving from the specification -2 days, announcement day to announcement day, +2 days Summarizing, expansionary monetary policy actions that lead to an immediate decrease in interest rate had negative effects on the stock returns of the companies included in our sample.
On the contrary, when the interest rates increased, we observed positive reactions in the markets.
Monetary policy actions produce larger effects on markets during crises periods. Additionally, the effectiveness of conventional and unconventional monetary policy actions appears to fade away after a prolonged period of enforcement and in ultra-low-yield environments. The asset and liability structure of (re)insurers appears to dampen the impact of changes in interest rates, compared to other sectors of the economy.
Reactions of the CDS market
The impact on the CDS market confirms the detrimental effect of monetary policy interventions that cause an immediate reduction in the risk-free rate curve, on (re)insurance undertakings (see Table 10 ). Regression 6 based on the first difference in CDS spreads confirms the statistically significant impact of the ECB monetary policy surprise in the first three periods of observation. The significance fades away in periods 4 and 5, in line with the results obtained for stock returns.
Coefficients, when statistically significant, display negative signs; therefore, an immediate reduction of the interest rates triggered by a monetary policy announcement of the ECB generates an increase in the CDS spreads of (re)insurance undertakings. This economic impact is consistent with that observed on stock market returns, namely, a reduction in stock returns is associated with a widening of the CDS spreads. Results related to the Fed monetary policy surprise do not show statistically significant results in any period. This outcome is not aligned with that observed for stock returns. The reduced sample (43 vs. 166) might serve as an explanation for the different behaviors of the regressor in the two specifications.
In the following section, we try to identify the items in the balance sheet of a (re)insurer that determine the higher or lower response to changes in interest rates. Table 11 reports the results of the Logit regressions based on indices built on balance sheet items. Empirical evidence shows how the sensitivity of (re)insurers to monetary policy surprises is driven by the asset side of the balance sheet. In line with our first hypothesis (Hp.1 ), the exposure of (re)insurers to fixed income assets acts as the main determinant of the sensitivity of (re)insurers to sudden changes in the reference interest rate. The monetary policy announcements indeed have a direct impact on prices of fixed income assets, and only indirect effects on other asset classes, such as equities, which, according to our results, do not play a significant
Analysis of Determinants
role. An expansionary monetary policy announcement that, as shown in the previous section, leads to a reduction of the risk-free rates across all maturities, causes a contraction in bond yields and a consequent increase in their market prices.
For a (re)insurer, the effect of the reduction in reference interest rates also has an impact on liabilities, with the values of the provisions moving in the opposite direction. This effect is expected to be more pronounced for those businesses that entail a longer duration. Based on this, and according to our second hypothesis (Hp.2 ), we expected that exposure to the life business would be a determinant of sensitivity to monetary policy surprises. The empirical evidence rejects this hypothesis. Exposures to Life business and to Non-insurance activities traditionally based on maturity transformation are not associated with statistical significance.
Furthermore, we observe that against our expectations (Hp.3 ), higher or lower engagement in Non-insurance Activities does not play a statistically significant role in determining the sensitivity of (re)insurers to monetary policy surprises. Therefore, our third hypothesis is rejected.
In conclusion, our empirical evidence shows how Size acts as a main determinant.
We also tested whether there is a relationship between monetary policy surprises and the 24 dividend policies of (re)insurance companies. The results, displayed in Table 12 , do not show a statistically significant relationship. 
Conclusions and way forward
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of conventional and unconventional monetary policies on the insurance industry by looking at the impact of the actions taken by the ECB on the market returns of (re)insurers. Additionally, we analyzed the characteristics of (re)insurers that drive the sensitivities of the companies to changes in interest rates.
We investigated the impact of monetary policy via two approaches. First, we conducted an event study on the announcement date of the last ECB Quantitative Easing program. We scrutinized the CARs of a sample of 166 (re)insurers split into different subsamples according to size and geographical criteria, and compared this with the behavior of the other market participants. Subsequently, with the aim of understanding the impact of general enforced monetary policy strategy and not of a single event, we enlarged the scope of our analysis by investigating the effects, on the markets in general and on insurers in particular, of a series of announcements made by the ECB and the Fed. To do so, we replicated the approach proposed by Rogers et al. (2014) and Pericoli and Veronese (2016) , analyzing how and to what extent the Central Banks announcements are signaled by the markets via changes in the term structure of the risk-free rate.
The event study suggests a moderate negative effect of the QE on the insurance industry.
The different specifications we tested show how the outcomes of the event study are strongly dependent on the observation period. Furthermore, we did not obtain statistically significant results for the subsamples. By applying the monetary policy surprise-based model, we document i) how the effect of monetary policy interventions on interest rates in the announcement days changes over time, and ii) the subsequent impact of expansionary monetary policy interventions on the market in general and on the insurance industry in particular.
25
Our empirical evidence suggests that when monetary policy actions generate an immediate reduction in interest rates (periods 1 and 2), the effect on stock returns is negative, whereas an increase in interest rates (period 3) is positively received by the markets. The impact on the stock market is larger during crisis periods than in tranquil periods and the effectiveness of the monetary policy actions tend to fade away after prolonged application and in an ultralow-yield environment (periods 4 and 5). This applies both to the ECB and FED actions with one distinction: FED interventions affect larger geographical areas than do ECB ones, with the latter having more concentrated but higher impacts. Monetary policy actions, when producing statistically significant results, have more limited results on (re)insurers than on other companies, particularly with respect to the ECB.
The balance sheet structure of (re)insurers, with assets and liabilities reacting in opposite directions to changes in the interest rates could serve as a rationale for these behaviors. Stock prices are defined by discounted future profits; therefore, the potential negative impacts of reduced interest rates on long-term obligations that characterize the life business overcome the short-term benefits deriving from the mark to market valuation of the assets. This explanation is also in line with the results obtained at the EU country level, where jurisdictions traditionally exposed to long-term obligations are more affected than others.
The impacts on (re)insurers were confirmed by the reactions of the CDS market. Our analysis shows how, during ECB monetary policy days when an instantaneous reduction of the interest rate is observed, the detrimental effect on the stock return is associated with a negative impact on CDS spreads. Given the limited sample, we consider the analysis on CDS still preliminary; however, the results are so far promising and in line with our expectations.
The two applied models returned consistent results. Nevertheless, this work shows how a single intervention extrapolated from the comprehensive strategy should be utilized with caution to estimate the effect of monetary policy intervention on the market.
In the second part of the paper, we investigated the characteristics of (re)insurers based in
Europe that drive the reaction to ECB monetary policy actions. To do so, we defined a set of balance sheet-based indicators aimed at capturing the asset allocation and product portfolio composition of each entity. We then used those indices as regressors for the sensitivity of a (re)insurer to monetary policy actions in a logit regression.
According to our results, only size and exposure to fixed income assets seems to drive the sensitivity of (re)insurers to monetary policy interventions. In contrast to our initial hypothesis, none of the liability-based indices provide statistically significant results.
Our balance sheet analysis is limited by the frequency and granularity of the information.
This paper would benefit from the availability of complete and accurate quarterly balance sheet data and from a thorough knowledge of the interactions between the assets and liability sides of the insurers, i.e. duration mismatch. Additionally, we do not provide a clear-cut explanation for the documented low effectiveness of the ECB and FED interventions in the last two periods of observation. We propose the prolonged enforcement of unidirectional monetary policy actions and the ultra-low-yield environment as potential explanations; however, at this stage we are unable to be more precise.
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We believe that this work provides an initial valuable contribution to the literature on the analyses of monetary policy, enriching it with a specific focus on the insurance industry.
Furthermore, the evidence we provide may be of interest for policymakers, offering them a wider perspective on the impacts that monetary policy actions have on a specific sector. Significance of the parameter expressed via T-statistics *=10% level, **=5%level, ***2.5%level. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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